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Spoilers or Governance Actors?  
Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood
Ulrich Schneckener
Abstract
Armed non-state groups pose a severe challenge for peace- and state-building processes. De-
pending on the situation, they may act as both spoilers and governance actors. This paper aims 
at presenting a framework for analysing armed groups as well as forms of engagement for 
international actors. It first describes various armed groups, which need to be distinguished 
in order to highlight specific profiles, as ideal types. Secondly, a number of strategies for dea-
ling with these groups will be introduced and discussed by referring to realist, institutionalist 
and constructivist approaches. Thirdly, the conclusion will point to key problems and limits of 
these approaches when addressing the spectrum of armed groups. The argument here is that 
these approaches - despite their differences - by and large are directed to similar profiles of 
armed groups while other forms of non-state violence are systematically neglected.
Zusammenfassung
Nicht-staatliche Gewaltakteure sind eine besondere Herausforderung für Peace- und State-
building-Prozesse. Je nach Situation agieren bewaffnete Gruppen als „Störenfriede“ oder als 
Governance-Akteure. Dieses Papier verfolgt die Absicht, einen konzeptionellen Rahmen für 
die Analyse von nicht-staatlichen Gewaltakteuren sowie der Gegenstrategien durch interna-
tionale Akteure bereitzustellen. Zunächst werden verschiedene Profile von bewaffneten Grup-
pen in Form von Idealtypen unterschieden. Zweitens werden eine Reihe von Strategien im 
Umgang mit solchen Akteuren eingeführt und diskutiert, wobei zwischen realistischen, in-
stitutionalistischen und konstruktivistischen Ansätzen unterschieden wird. Drittens verweist 
das Papier auf zentrale Probleme und Grenzen dieser Ansätze. Insbesondere wird deutlich, 
dass sich diese Strategien – ungeachtet ihrer inhaltlichen Differenzen – auf ähnliche Profile 
bewaffneter Gruppen konzentrieren, während andere Formen von nichtstaatlicher Gewalt 
systematisch vernachlässigt werden. 
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Abbreviations
AAA	 	 Alianza	Anticomunista	Argentina	(Argentine	Anticommunist	Alliance)
ALN	 	 Ação	Libertadora	Nacional	(National	Liberation	Action,	Brazil)
ANC	 	 African	National	Congress,	South	Africa
AUC	 	 Autodefensas	Unidas	de	Colombia	(United	Self-Defense	Forces	of	Colombia)
DIE	 	 Deutsches	Institut	für	Entwicklungspolitik	(German	Development	Institute)
ELN	 	 Ejército	de	Liberación	Nacional	(National	Liberation	Army,	Colombia)
EZLN	 	 Ejército	Zapatista	de	Liberación	Nacional	
	 	 (Zapatista	Army	of	National	Liberation,	Mexico)
FARC	 	 Fuerzas	Armadas	Revolucionarias	de	Colombia	
	 	 (Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	of	Colombia)
FMLN	 	 Frente	Farabundo	Martí	para	la	Liberación	Nacional	
	 	 (Farabundo	Martí	National	Liberation	Front,	El	Savador)
GAM	 	 Gerakan	Aceh	Merdeka	(Free	Aceh	Movement,	Indonesia)
ICG	 	 International	Crisis	Group
LRA	 	 Lord	Resistance	Army,	Uganda
LTTE	 	 Liberation	Tigers	of	Tamil	Eelam,	Sri	Lanka
PAGAD	 People	Against	Gangsterism	and	Drugs,	South	Africa
POLISARIO	 Frente	Popular	para	la	Liberación	de	Saguía	el	Hamra	y	Río	de	Oro	(Popular		
	 	 Front	for	the	Liberation	of	Saguia	el	Hamra	and	Río	de	Oro,	Western	Sahara)
PSC	 	 Private	Security	Company
PMC	 	 Private	Military	Company
RENAMO	 Resistência	Nacional	Moçambicana	(Mozambican	National	Resistance)
SPLA	 	 Sudan	People’s	Liberation	Army	
TIT	 	 Türk	Intikam	Tugayi	(Turkish	Revenge	Brigades)
UCDP	 	 Uppsala	Conflict	Data	Program
UÇK	 	 Ushtria	Çlirimtare	e	Kosovës	(Kosovo	Liberation	Army)
UDA	 	 Ulster	Defense	Association	
UNITA		 União	Nacional	para	a	Independência	Total	de	Angola	
	 	 (National	Union	for	the	Total	Independence	of	Angola)
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1. Introduction: Spoilers or Governance Actors?1
Be	it	pirates,	mercenaries,	warlords,	bandits,	partisans	or	tribal	chiefs:	Armed	non-state	groups	
have	been	constant	companions	of	wars	and	violent	conflicts	for	centuries.	From	a	historical	
point	of	view,	the	figure	of	the	non-state	armed	actor	can	be	seen	as	the	antagonist	to	the	state’s	
monopoly	on	the	use	of	force,	which	was	successively	established	in	Europe	and	later	elsewhere	
against	the	various	forms	of	non-state	violence	–	either	by	exerting	power	and	containment	or	
through	negotiations	with	and	incorporation	of	these	actors	into	state	structures.	Armed	groups	
are	therefore	neither	a	novel	phenomenon	nor	a	new	challenge	for	state	actors.	The	current	
interest	in	these	groups,	however,	is	due	to	the	fact	that	for	a	successful	conflict	resolution	as	
well	as	for	post-conflict	state-building	promoted	by	external	actors	the	engagement	with	armed	
groups	has	become	an	issue	of	crucial	importance.	There	can	be	no	doubt	that	armed	non-state	
groups	of	different	type	dominate	the	situation	during	and	after	armed	conflict	in	manifold	
ways.	On	the	one	hand,	they	are	responsible	for	violence	against	unarmed	civilians	as	much	as	
for	the	establishment	of	criminal	and	informal	shadow	economies.	On	the	other	hand,	armed	
groups	are	often	the	result	of	socio-economic	and	political	problems,	they	may	see	themselves	
as	advocates	for	such	grievances	and	may	build	on	broad	support	within	the	population.
A	glance	at	the	data	delineates	the	quantitative	dimension	of	the	problem:	The	Uppsala	Con-
flict	Data	Program	(UCDP)	registered	a	total	of	124	armed	conflicts	between	1989	and	2007,	of	
which	91	were	intrastate	and	26	internationalised	intrastate	conflicts.2	In	these	conflicts	at	least	
one	armed	non-state	actor	is	involved	but	normally	multiple	militant	groups	will	be	implica-
ted.	Looking	only	at	rebels	fighting	a	government,	the	researchers	conclude	that,	for	example,	
in	2002	and	2003	more	than	30%	of	the	active	conflicts	involved	more	than	one	rebel	group	
(Harbom/Melander/Wallensteen	 2008:	 697).	Moreover,	 the	UCDP	 has	 introduced	“non-state	
conflict”	as	a	new	category,	which	refers	to	violent	encounters	between	non-state	actors	only.	In	
2002,	36	“non-state	conflicts”	were	registered	(compared	to	32	conflicts	involving	a	state	actor),	
in	2006	the	figure	was	24	(compared	to	33	with	state	involvement)	(see	Human	Security	Centre	
2007).3	In	the	absence	of	a	reliable	database	that	sheds	light	on	the	approximate	total	of	armed	
groups,	the	IISS	Military	Balance	2007	may	serve	as	an	illustration:	It	lists	345	armed	non-state	
actors	worldwide,	50	of	whom	are	active	in	India	alone,	25	in	Iraq,	21	in	Pakistan	and	half	a	dozen	
in	each	Bangladesh	and	Nigeria	(see	Hackett	2007:	422-438).	
1	 The	paper	did	profit	from	a	research	project	(2008-2010)	funded	by	the	German	Foundation	for	Peace	
Research	 on	 the	 role	 of	NGOs	 in	dealing	with	 armed	 groups.	 I	 therefore	would	 like	 to	 thank	 the	
Foundation	for	its	support	and	in	particular	my	colleague	Claudia	Hofmann	for	helpful	comments	at	
various	stages	of	the	drafting	process	of	this	paper.
2	 http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP_dyadic_dataset_1.0_Online_appendix.pdf;	
20.9.2009.
3	 The	UCDP	has	listed	27	countries	which	have	been	affected	by	“non-state	conflicts”	since	2002:	Mexi-
co,	Guatemala,	Ecuador,	Colombia,	Brazil,	Senegal,	Cote	d’Ivoire,	Ghana,	Nigeria,	DR	Congo,	Burundi,	
Uganda,	Kenya,	 Sudan,	Chad,	 Ethiopia,	 Somalia,	 Iraq,	 Palestine/Israel,	Afghanistan,	 India,	 Pakistan,	
Nepal,	Sri	Lanka,	Bangladesh,	Myanmar,	Philippines.	See	http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php;	
9.5.2009.
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The	debate	about	the	role	of	non-state	armed	groups	is	by	and	large	shaped	by	two	opposing	
angles:	The	first	perspective	which	dominates	the	political	discourse	and	the	literature	on	coun-
ter-insurgency	perceives	these	actors	mainly	as	a	“problem”.	They	are	not	only	seen	as	actors	
who	may	cause	and	trigger	violent	conflicts,	but	also	as	actors	who	make	it	increasingly	difficult	
to	end	wars	and	restore	peace	and	stability.	After	armed	conflicts,	they	still	act	as	“spoilers”	who	
have	the	potential	to	disturb,	undermine,	or	completely	truncate	processes	of	post-conflict	state	
building,	leading	to	violence	flare-ups.4	Thereby,	these	actors	constantly	question	the	concept	
of	the	state’s	monopoly	of	the	use	of	force.	Moreover,	in	many	instances,	such	as	Somalia,	DR	
Congo,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 Liberia,	 Palestine,	 Iraq,	Afghanistan	 or	 Pakistan	 armed	 groups	 are	 not	
only	a	“local”	affair,	but	they	act	across	borders	and	may	destabilise	entire	regions;	some	–	such	
as	transnational	terrorist	networks	–	even	pose	threats	to	international	security.	And,	finally,	
external	actors,	ranging	from	UN	peace	operations	to	development	NGOs,	are	in	many	ways	
directly	affected	by	the	these	actors	who	may	attack	or	threaten	international	troops,	police	offi-
cers	or	aid	workers:	they	may	take	foreigners	as	hostages,	prevent	humanitarian	aid	from	being	
delivered	to	the	population,	or	cause	a	lack	of	international	investment	and	of	development.	
The	underlying	assumption	of	the	“spoiler”	perspective	is	that	these	actors	show	no	interests	
in	peace	processes	and	state	stability	because	of	various	political	and	socio-economic	reasons.	
However,	in	the	literature	reference	is	made	to	various	types	of	spoilers	(Stedman	1997)	as	well	
as	to	various	methods	of	spoiling	(e.g.	the	selective	or	the	indiscriminate	use	of	violence,	see	
Kalyvas	2006:	146-209).	
In	contrast,	the	second	perspective	does	not	refer	to	these	actors	as	“problems”,	but	rather	asks	
whether	and	under	which	conditions	these	groups	may	serve	as	“governance	actors”	who	are	
willing	and	able	to	provide	basic	services	beyond	their	own	membership	for	larger	segments	
of	the	civilian	population	–	be	it	protection,	access	to	resources	and	jobs,	taxation,	supply	of	
food,	water	and	medical	care	or	even	elements	of	jurisdiction.	In	some	instances,	these	services	
may	work	as	“functional	equivalents”	to	regular	state	activities	and	assure	a	certain	degree	of	
stability	in	areas	of	limited	statehood	although	the	distribution	of	goods	may	often	be	selective	
and	arbitrary	as	well	as	based	on	a	patron-client-relationship.	From	this	point	of	view,	the	que-
stion	arises	whether	or	not	armed	groups	and	their	leaders	also	have	the	potential	to	serve	as	
“stabiliser”	and	to	become	“part	of	the	solution”	in	state-	and	peacebuilding	processes.5	In	the	
literature,	this	approach	has	been	substantiated	by	empirical	research	and	by	concepts	such	as	
“legitimate	oligopolies	of	violence”	(Mehler	2003,	2006),	which	are	established	at	local	level	by	
various	armed	groups	in	order	to	secure	a	minimum	of	stability,	an	“outsourcing	of	statehood”	
(Zürcher	2007)	where	state	institutions	de	facto	hand	over	governance	functions	to	non-state	
actors,	“commercialised	security”	(Chojnacki/Branović	2007)	where	various	armed	actors	offer	
their	services	on	a	“security	market”,	or	forms	of	“transnational	security	governance”	(Schne-
ckener/Zürcher	2007).	The	latter	refers	to	situations	where	international	and	local	actors,	inclu-
ding	armed	groups	such	as	militia,	clan	chiefs	or	(former)	warlords,	cooperate	in	an	informal	
4	 For	the	spoiler	concept	see:	Stedman	(1997);	Schneckener	(2003);	Newman/Richmond	(2006);	Greenhill/
Major	(2006).
5	 For	example,	in	a	report	the	International	Crisis	Group	(see	ICG	2006)	asked	the	question	whether	
Iraq’s	militant	Shiite	leader	Muqtada	Al-Sadr	is	a	“spoiler”	or	“stabilizer”.
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or	formalised	way	so	as	to	achieve	a	secure	environment	and	to	deliver	services	to	the	local	po-
pulation	(see	e.g.	the	international	involvement	in	Kosovo	or	Afghanistan).	These	arrangements	
usually	emerge	in	an	ad	hoc	fashion,	for	instance	in	the	context	of	coordination	or	consultation	
bodies	(e.g.	for	aid	delivery),	in	which	both	international	and	local	actors	are	represented.	Some	
of	these	forms	of	governance	have	proved	to	be	long-standing,	others	turn	out	to	be	rather	tran-
sient	phenomena	that	vanish	as	soon	as	the	local	situation	changes.	
Both	perspectives	lead	to	different	forms	of	engagement	with	armed	groups.	In	the	first	case,	
military,	police	and	law-enforcement	measures	or	containment	strategies	seem	to	be	approp-
riate,	whereas	from	the	second	perspective	attempts	for	integration	and	socialisation	of	the-
se	groups	may	be	seen	as	more	promising.	However,	armed	non-state	actors	are	usually	both	
–	spoilers	as	well	as	governance-actors	–	at	once.	With	regard	to	some	issues	or	particular	actors	
they	may	behave	as	spoilers,	whereas	in	other	areas	they	have	an	interest	in	delivering	to	local	
constituencies,	cooperating	with	others	and	showing	compliance	with	certain	agreements.	In	
other	words,	it	remains	an	empirical	–	and	not	a	conceptual	–	question	under	which	circum-
stances	armed	groups	behave	in	one	way	or	another.	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	not	to	answer	this	
question	but	to	present	a	general	framework	for	analysing	armed	non-state	actors,	their	typical	
characteristics	and	behaviour	as	well	as	possible	forms	of	engagement	for	international	actors,	
be	it	a	government,	an	international	organisation	or	an	NGO.	Therefore,	 the	paper	will	first	
describe	various	armed	groups,	which	need	to	be	distinguished	in	order	to	highlight	specific	
profiles,	as	ideal	types.	Secondly,	a	number	of	strategies	for	dealing	with	these	groups	will	be	
introduced	and	discussed	by	referring	to	realist,	institutionalist	and	constructivist	approaches.	
Thirdly,	the	conclusion	will	point	to	key	problems	and	limits	of	these	approaches	when	addres-
sing	 the	 spectrum	of	 armed	groups.	The	paper,	however,	 does	not	 link	particular	 strategies	
with	particular	types	of	non-state	armed	groups.	This	would	not	seem	to	be	appropriate,	since	
a	number	of	factors	which	can	not	be	discussed	in	this	paper	in	detail	would	determine	the	
success	or	failure	of	these	strategies,	the	type	of	armed	group	being	just	one	of	them.	The	argu-
ment	here	is	much	more	moderate	in	stating	that	these	approaches	–	despite	their	differences	
–	by	and	large	are	directed	to	similar	profiles	of	armed	groups	while	other	forms	of	non-state	
violence	are	systematically	neglected.	
2. The “Universe” of Armed Non-State Groups
Generally	speaking,	armed non-state groups	are	(i)	willing	and	capable	to	use	violence	for	pursuing	
their	objectives	and	(ii)	not	integrated	into	formalised	state	institutions	such	as	regular	armies,	
presidential	guards,	police	or	 special	 forces.	They,	 therefore,	 (iii)	possess	 a	 certain	degree	of	
autonomy	with	regard	to	politics,	military	operations,	resources	and	infrastructure.	They	may,	
however,	be	supported	or	used	by	state	actors	whether	in	an	official	or	informal	manner.	Mo-
reover,	there	may	also	be	state	officials	who	are	directly	or	indirectly	involved	in	the	activities	
of	armed	non-state	actors	–	sometimes	because	of	ideological	reasons,	but	not	seldom	due	to	
personal	interests	(i.e.	corruption,	family	or	clan	ties,	clientelism,	profit).	Finally,	they	(iv)	are	
shaped	through	an	organisational	relationship	or	structure	that	exists	over	a	specific	period	of	
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time	(e.g.	spontaneous	riots	would	not	qualify).	Against	this	background,	the	following	typology	
aims	at	identifying	the	most	important	and	most	frequently	encountered	armed	non-state	ac-
tors	as	well	as	at	highlighting	their	specific	characteristics,	based	on	definitions	and	concepts	
found	in	the	literature	as	well	as	illustrated	by	some	examples.6
Rebels	or	guerrilla fighters,	sometimes	also	referred	to	as	partisans	or	franc tireurs,	are	the	arche-
type	of	armed	non-state	actors.	They	seek	the	“liberation”	of	a	social	class	or	a	political	commu-
nity	(“nation”).	They	fight	for	the	overthrow	of	a	government,	for	the	secession	of	a	region	or	
for	the	end	of	an	occupational	or	colonial	regime.	In	that	sense,	they	pursue	a	political	agenda,	
most	often	based	on	a	social-revolutionary,	ethno-nationalistic	or	religiously	inspired	ideolo-
gy.	They	see	themselves	as	‘future	armies’	of	a	liberated	population	or	community.	Hence	they	
sometimes	wear	uniforms	and	emblems,	they	have	a	command	and	rank	structure	as	well	as	
internal	rules	of	the	conduct	of	violent	actions.	In	their	military	operations	they	avoid	direct	
confrontation	with	their	opponents;	therefore,	guerrilla	warfare	typically	begins	in	rural	areas,	
mountainous	 regions	or	 in	 remote	 areas	 that	 are	beyond	 the	 central	 government’s	 control.7	
Some	writers	have	propagated	the	concept	of	an	urban	guerrilla	that	is	supposed	to	function	
as	a	vanguard	for	the	rural	guerrilla.8	According	to	the	doctrine	of	guerrilla	warfare	as	develo-
ped	by	Mao Tse Tung, Ernesto Che Guevara	or	Frantz Fanon,	guerrilla	fighters	depend	on	the	local	
population	 for	 logistic	 and	moral	 support.	 In	 reality,	 however,	 the	most	 significant	 support	
comes	from	foreign	governments	or	various	non-state	actors	that	provide	safe	havens,	weapons,	
equipment	and	know-how.	Historical	examples	are	among	others	the	partisans	during	World	
War	II	who	fought	against	German	occupation,	the	anti-colonial	movements	after	1945	as	well	
as	the	VietCong	and	the	Red	Khmer	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.	More	recent	examples	are	RENA-
MO	in	Mozambique,	the	FMLN	in	El	Salvador,	UNITA	in	Angola,	the	Zapatista	EZLN	in	Mexico,	
the	FARC	and	the	ELN	in	Colombia,	the	Maoist	rebels	in	India	and	Nepal	or	a	number	of	rebel	
movements	in	DR	Congo,	supported	by	Rwanda	and	Uganda.	Also	separatist	movements	such	
as	the	SPLA	in	Southern	Sudan,	POLISARIO	in	West-Sahara,	GAM	in	Aceh/Indonesia,	the	LTTE	
in	Sri	Lanka	or	the	UÇK	in	Kosovo	developed	rebel-style	politics.	
Militias	are	irregular,	paramilitary	combat	units	that	aim	at	protecting	and	defending	the	in-
terests	of	the	government	and/or	certain	segments	of	the	society.	They	usually	act	on	behalf	of,	
or	are	at	least	tolerated	by,	the	political	establishment	(see	Ero	2000;	Francis	2005).	Militias	are	
often	created,	 funded,	 equipped	and	 trained	 in	anti-guerrilla	 tactics	 (counter-insurgency)	by	
state	authorities	or	directly	by	ruling	elites	but	they	are	generally	not	legalised,	i.e.	they	do	not	
	
6	 For	similar	attempts,	see	Mair	(2003);	Wulf	(2005:	54-62);	McCartney	(2006:	3-4).
7	 On	the	tactics	of	guerrilla	warfare,	see	Münkler	(1992:	152-162);	Daase	(1999);	O’Neill	(2005:	45-65).	On	
organisational	and	political	aspects	of	rebel	movements	see	in	particular	Weinstein	(2007).
8	 One	of	the	most	prominent	proponents	of	urban	guerrilla	was	the	Brazilian	Carlos Marighela,	whose	
Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare	(1969)	inspired	numerous	(mostly	leftist)	guerrillas	and	terrorist	
groups.	Marighela	himself	founded	the	ALN	(Ação Libertadora Nacional)	that	became	known	to	a	larger	
public	through	the	terrorist	attacks	it	launched.
Spoilers or Governance Actors?  |  10
act	under	written	and	transparent	provisions.9	Their	task	is	often	to	fight	rebels	or	criminals,	
to	threaten	specific	groups	(i.e.	minorities)	or	to	intimidate	members	of	opposition	parties.	On	
behalf	of	the	government	they	may	handle	the	dirty	business	of	targeted	kidnappings	and	kil-
lings,	massacres,	ethnic	cleansing	or	even	genocide	as	in	the	case	of	the	Hutu	extremist	group	
Interahamwé	 in	 1994,	 sponsored	 by	 the	 government	 of	 Rwanda.	Nevertheless	militias	 often	
evade	government	control	and,	in	the	course	of	a	conflict,	develop	their	own	agenda.	One	pro-
minent	example	would	be	the	development	of	the	anti-rebel	movement	Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia	(AUC)	in	Colombia	(see	Richani	2007).	Self-proclaimed	defenders	of	a	status	quo	such	
as	 ‘protection	 forces’	 (Schutzbünde	 or	Heimwehren),	 political	 party	militias	 or	 armed	 vigilante	
groups	(e.g.	Ku	Klux	Klan	in	the	US)	also	fall	into	this	category	when	they	protect	the	(reported)	
interests	of	segments	of	the	population	that	benefit	from	the	current	political	situation	and	do	
not	want	to	loose	their	political	or	economic	status	(such	as	land	owners,	former	combatants,	
officers,	dominant	ethno-national	groups).	Some	of	these	groups	may	therefore	also	attack	the	
political	establishment	or	state	institutions	when	their	privileges	or	superior	role	are	put	into	
question.	Another	sub-type	is	self-help	defence	forces	or	anti-gang	militias	who	claim	to	try	to	
protect	a	certain	community	against	crime	and	corruption	because	the	state	is	unable	or	un-
willing.	Often,	however,	these	groups	themselves	pose	a	threat	to	their	neighbourhood	by	igno-
ring	laws	and	violating	human	rights	–	an	example	is	the	South-African	group	People Against 
Gangsterism and Drugs	 (Pagad),	mainly	based	 in	Western	Cape	and	KwaZulu-Natal,	who	were	
responsible	for	a	number	of	attacks	on	local	ANC	politicians	reportedly	involved	in	organised	
crime	or	corruption	(Ero	2000:	26-27).	Due	to	the	elusiveness	of	the	militia	concept,	a	variety	of	
groups	can	be	subsumed	under	this	heading	such	as	the	right-wing	extremist	White	Hand	in	
Guatemala,	the	Argentine	Triple	A	(Alianza Anticommunista Argentina),	the	anti-Kurdish	Turkish	
Revenge	Brigade	(TIT),	the	protestant	Ulster	Defence	Association	(UDA)	in	Northern	Ireland,	
the	pro-Serbian	Arkan	Tigers	in	Bosnia	and	Kosovo,	the	pro-Indonesian	groups	Aitarak	(thorn)	
and	Besi Merah Putih	(red-and-white	iron)	in	Timor-Leste	or	the	government-backed	Janjaweed	
militia	in	Western	Sudan	(Darfur).
Clan chiefs or	Big Men	are	traditional,	local	authorities	who	head	a	particular	tribe,	clan,	ethnic	
or	religious	community.10	In	other	words,	they	are	the	leaders	of	an	identity-based	group,	deeply	
rooted	in	history	and	traditions.	Thus,	they	have	usually	attained	their	positions	as	leaders	ac-
cording	to	traditional	rules,	whether	by	virtue	of	their	age	and	experience,	ancestry	or	personal	
ability	(charisma).	In	this	regard,	they	can	be	seen	as	legitimate	representatives	of	their	people.	
Most	often,	they	control	a	certain	territory	which	may	range	from	a	few	peripheral	villages	or	
settlements	to	larger	regions.	While	this	control	can	be	formalised	in	para-state	kingdoms	or	
chiefdoms	with	a	certain	degree	of	autonomy,	it	may	also	be	more	informal	since	in	many	cases	
it	either	exists	parallel	to	or	cuts	across	administrative	units	of	the	state	(von	Trotha	2000).	Most	
chiefs	or	big	men	also	command	an	armed	force	recruited	from	male	members	of	their	tribe	
9	 However,	in	some	countries	private	citizens	are	allowed	by	constitution	or	special	laws	to	acquire	and	
to	carry	firearms	(see	e.g.	the	2nd	amendment	to	the	US	constitution	or	the	Colombian	Decree	3398	of	
1965).	These	provisions	are	often	regarded	as	the	legal	basis	for	the	establishment	of	militia	groups.
10	This	definition	does	not	include	corrupt	and	autocratic	African	presidents	or	politicians	(e.g.	the	for-
mer	president	Mobutu	of	Zaire)	which	in	the	literature	are	also	sometimes	called	‘Big	Men’.
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or	clan.	These	forces	are	mainly	set	up	for	the	purpose	of	protection	and	self-defence	as	well	as	
for	assuring	the	political	order	and	for	deterring	and	fighting	internal	rivals.	Examples	of	this	
type	can	be	found	mainly	in	clan-based	societies	in	sub-Saharan	Africa	(see	the	various	clan	fa-
milies	in	Somalia,	the	Tuaregs	in	Mali,	the	Baganda	in	Uganda	and	the	Zulu	in	South	Africa),	in	
Central	Asia	or	in	the	Pacific	region	as	well	as	in	countries	like	Yemen,	Afghanistan	or	Pakistan	
(e.g.	Pashtun	tribal	areas	along	the	Afghan-Pakistani	border).11
Warlords	are	local	potentates	who	control	a	particular	territory	during	or	after	the	end	of	a	vio-
lent	conflict.12	They	secure	their	power	through	private	armies	which	are	recruited	and	paid	by	
the	warlord	himself.	The	relationship	between	warlord	and	fighters	is	therefore	primarily	based	
on	personal	loyalty	and	to	a	much	lesser	degree	on	ethnic	ties	or	ideology.	An	early	definition	
of	the	term	refers	to	the	historic	case	of	the	Chinese	warlords	(junfa)	in	the	1910s	and	1920s:	A	
warlord	is	a	man	who	“exercised	effective	governmental	control	over	a	fairly	well-defined	region	
by	means	of	a	military	organisation	that	obeyed	no	higher	authority	than	himself ”	(Sheridan	
1966:	1,	quoted	in	Vinci	2007:	315).	Moreover,	warlords	themselves	–	Max	Weber	used	the	term	
Kriegsfürst	–	are	independent	from	any	higher	authority	(see	Giustozzi	2003:	2;	Jackson	2003:	134).	
Modern	warlords	are	a	typical	by-product	of	long-standing	civil	wars.	Some	of	them,	however,	
manage	to	perpetuate	their	position	also	after	the	end	of	combat	activities	and	shape	the	post-
war	order.	Quite	often	they	attempt	 to	 legalise	 the	benefits	 they	acquired	during	the	war	by	
running	for	public	office.	Generally,	warlords	benefit	in	particular	from	the	lack	or	the	break-
down	of	state	structures.	They	use	war	or	post-war	economies	by	exploiting	resources	(such	as	
precious	metals,	tropical	timber,	commodities	or	drug	cultivation)	and/or	the	local	population	
(for	instance,	through	looting	or	levying	‘taxes’).	In	doing	so,	they	frequently	capitalise	on	cross-
border	ties	and	links	to	global	networks	and	illicit	markets.	In	particular,	this	kind	of	political	
economy	highlights	their	“parasitic	nature”	which	separates	a	warlord	organisation	“from	the	
state,	tribe,	or	other	form	of	political	community”	 (Vinci	2007:	327-328).	Prominent	examples	
of	warlords	–	some	of	them	later	assumed	high-ranking	political	positions	in	the	government	
–	are	Mohammed	Farah	Aidid	(Somalia),	Charles	Taylor	(Liberia),	Laurent-Désiré	Kabila	(Zaire/
DR	Congo)	and	Abdul	Rashid	Dostum	(Afghanistan).	
Terrorists	use	violent	means	 for	spreading	panic	and	fear	among	the	population	 in	order	 to	
achieve	political	goals,	be	they	based	on	left-	or	right-wing,	on	social-revolutionary,	ethno-na-
tional	or	 religious	 ideologies	 (see	Guelke	1995;	Waldmann	1998).	They	use	violence	not	only	
to	shock	and	intimidate	society	but	also	to	mobilise	sympathisers	and	supporters	as	well	as	
to	contribute	to	the	radicalisation	of	a	conflict.	In	this	sense,	terrorism	is	a	“communication	
strategy”	 conveying	political	messages	 to	 friends	 and	 foes	 alike	 (Waldmann	 1998:	 13).	Terro-
rist	groups	are	typically	organised	in	a	clandestine	way,	most	often	in	small	groups	and	cells,	
sometimes	also	 in	 larger	cross-border	networks.	Most	 long-standing	terrorist	groups	have	a	
certain	degree	of	hierarchy	with	a	leadership	and	command	level	at	the	top;	however,	the	cell	
11	See	 the	 classic	 analysis	 by	 Sahlins	 (1963).	 For	more	 recent	 examples	 of	 clan	 politics	 see	 Englebert	
(2002);	Ssereo	(2003);	Collins	(2004,	2006);	Schatz	(2004).
12	On	warlordism	 see	 Reno	 (1998);	 Nissen/Radtke	 (2002);	 Jackson	 (2003);	 Giustozzi	 (2003,	 2005);	Vinci	
(2007).
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structure	is	often	organised	in	a	network	style	with	various	nodes	linking	rather	autonomous	
cells	or	groups.	One	may	distinguish	between	local	terrorists	who	aim	primarily	at	changing	
an	existing	political	order	at	the	national	level	(e.g.	change	of	political	regime,	separatism)	and	
transnational	terrorists	such	as	Al	Qaida	or	Jemaah	Islamyyah	who	address	the	international	
order	or	 the	 state-system	 in	 a	wider	 region	and	who	are	 linked	by	 a	 transnational	 ideology	
which	bridges	national,	ethnic,	geographical	or	linguistic	differences	(see	Schneckener	2006).	
Militarily	speaking,	terrorists	are	relatively	weak	actors	who	use	terrorist	attacks	primarily	as	
a	means	for	getting	attention	for	their	ideology	and	grievances.	Typical	tactical	means	include	
kidnapping,	hostage-taking,	sabotage,	murder,	suicide	attacks,	vehicle	bombs	and	improvised	
explosive	devices	as	well	as	potentially	the	use	of	material	for	weapons	of	mass	destruction	(e.g.	
“dirty	bombs”).	Potential	targets	range	from	military	sites,	police	stations	and	official	govern-
ment	buildings	to	companies,	airports,	restaurants,	shopping	malls	and	means	of	public	trans-
port.	Historic	and	current	examples	of	groups	and	organisations	who	primarily	use	terrorist	
means	are	the	Red	Army	Faction	in	Germany,	the	Action	Directe	in	France,	the	Basque	ETA,	the	
Northern	Irish	IRA,	the	Kurdish	PKK,	the	Islamic	Jihad	in	Egypt	or	the	various	Islamic	groups	
in	India,	Pakistan	and	Indonesia.	
Criminals	 are	 systematically	 involved	 in	 illegal	 activities	 in	order	 to	 gain	material	 benefits.13	
They	are	often	organised	in	Mafia-type	structures,	syndicates,	gangs	or	larger	networks.	The	list	
of	possible	crimes	and	offences	is	long	and	includes	smuggling,	robbery,	fraud,	blackmailing,	
piracy,	contract	killing,	money	laundering,	trafficking	of	human	beings,	product	piracy	and,	in	
particular,	illegal	cross-border	trading	of	drugs,	weapons,	nuclear	material,	human	organs,	tim-
ber	and	commodities.	Most	groups	today	are	not	specialised	in	one	area	but	tend	to	be	involved	
in	various	fields,	depending	on	the	opportunity	structure	at	hand.	Organised	crime	groups,	at	
least	their	leaders,	sometimes	seek	political	influence	in	order	to	secure	their	profit	interests.	
For	that	matter,	they	use	means	such	as	bribery,	blackmailing,	intimidation	and	murder	against	
politicians,	policemen	and	judges.14	Therefore,	criminals	do	not	fight	against	the	state	or	a	par-
ticular	government	but	rather	aim	at	infiltrating	and	undermining	public	authorities.	Usually	
criminals	use	violent	means	selectively	so	as	not	to	receive	too	much	attention	from	law	en-
forcement	bodies.	However,	in	some	instances,	violence	may	escalate	to	a	war-like	level,	in	parti-
cular	when	competing	criminal	groups	fight	each	other	and	the	state	reacts	by	activating	special	
forces	or	the	military.	For	example,	the	most	recent	drug-related	struggle	in	Mexico,	involving	
four	drug	cartels	 (Sinaloa, Tijuana, Juárez	 and	Gulf),	 caused	more	 than	10.000	deaths	between	
2006	and	2008	(see	Hoffmann	2009).	Prominent	historic	and	current	cases	of	manifest	criminal	
structures,	sometimes	developed	over	decades	and	generations,	are	the	US-American	La Cosa 
Nostra,	 the	 Italian	mafias	 (the	 Sicilian	Cosa Nostra,	 the	Calabrian	Ndrangheta,	 the	Neapolitan	
Camorra	and	the	Apulian	Sacra Cordona Unita),	various	Japanese	Yakuzas,	the	Chinese	Triads	and	
13	The	UN	Convention	Against	Transnational	Organized	Crime	(2000)	defines	in	Art.	2	an	“organized	cri-
me	group”	as	“a	structured	group	of	three	or	more	persons,	existing	for	a	period	of	time	and	acting	in	
concert	with	the	aim	of	committing	one	or	more	serious	crimes	or	offences	established	in	accordance	
with	this	Convention,	in	order	to	obtain,	directly	or	indirectly,	a	financial	or	other	material	benefit.”
14	For	an	overview	on	organised	crime	see	Krasmann	(1997);	Williams	(2001);	Galeotti	(2001);	Naim	(2005).	
See	also	a	special	issue	of	Global	Crime	(2004)	on	criminal	networks.
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the	Asian	Big Circle Boys,	the	Russian	mafiya	groupings	(e.g.	Solntseva,	Tambov),	the	Taiwanese	
United Bamboo Gang	or	drug	cartels	in	Colombia/USA	(e.g.	Cali, Medellin, Norte del Valle).	Other	
examples	are	the	A.Q.	Khan	network	in	Pakistan,	which	dealt	illegally	with	material	and	know-
how	about	weapons	of	mass	destruction	(see	Heupel	2008)	or	the	activities	of	the	Russian	arms	
trader	Victor	Bout	who	had	built	up	a	network	of	firms	in	order	to	provide	arms	in	a	number	of	
conflicts	(e.g.	Angola,	West	Africa,	Afghanistan)	despite	international	sanctions	(see	Farah/Braun	
2007).	Most	criminal	organisations	operate	across	borders,	they	have	links	and	presences	in	a	
number	of	countries,	frequently	based	on	family	ties,	ethnic	networks	or	migration	patterns.	
They	are	nevertheless	often	organised	hierarchically	with	a	single	patron	or	a	“committee”	of	
gang	leaders	at	the	top	level.	
Mercenaries and private security/military companies	(PSCs/PMCs)	are	volunteers	usually	recruited	
from	third	states	who	are	remunerated	for	fighting	in	combat	units	or	for	conducting	special	
tasks	on	their	own.	They	can	serve	different	masters,	ranging	from	the	army	of	a	state	to	warlords	
who	promise	rewards.	Therefore,	in	civil	wars	mercenaries	are	frequently	found	fighting	on	all	
sides.	Often	these	mercenaries	are	demobilised	soldiers	or	former	rebel	fighters	who	now	offer	
their	know-how	to	other	warring	parties.	Mercenarism	has	a	long-standing	tradition:	Among	
its	famous	precursors	are	the	Condottieri	–	contractors	who	led	bands	of	mercenaries	hired	for	
protective	purposes	by	Italian	city-states	or	princes	from	the	15th	century	onwards.	Other	histo-
ric	examples	are	mercenaries	in	the	30	Years	War	(1618	to	1648)	or	during	the	post-WW2	period	
of	decolonisation,	e.g.	the	activities	of	former	German	Wehrmacht	officers	in	Congo	(‘Kongo-
Müller’).	This	category	also	includes	professional	‘bounty	hunters’	who	hunt	down	wanted	(war)	
criminals	or	terrorists	either	on	behalf	of	a	government	or	on	their	own	account	in	return	for	
financial	rewards.	While	traditional	mercenaries	are	banned	under	international	law,	modern	
private	security	or	military	companies	usually	act	on	a	legalised	and	licensed	basis.	They	have	
professionalised	and	commercialised	the	business	of	providing	combatants,	trainers	or	advi-
sers,	or	other	forms	of	operational	or	logistical	support,	and	are	contracted	by	governments,	
companies	or	other	non-state	actors.15	Moreover,	some	are	actively	involved	in	combat	situa-
tions,	often	for	counter-insurgency	purposes.	Because	of	the	different	services,	Kümmel	(2005:	
146-151)	distinguishes	between	“military	provider	firms”,	“security	provider	firms”,	“military	and	
security	consultant	firms”	and	“military	and	security	support	firms”.	A	large	number	of	these	
companies,	typically	set	up	by	former	army	or	police	officers	as	well	as	intelligence	and	security	
experts,	are	based	in	the	US,	Great	Britain,	South	Africa,	France,	Canada	or	Israel	(see	Kinsey	
2006:	4-6).	Prominent	and	well-documented	examples	are	the	activities	of	 the	South	African	
company	Executive Outcomes	in	Angola	and	Sierra	Leone,	the	British	Defence System Ltd.	in	Co-
lombia,	the	US	firm	Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI)	in	Croatia	and	Bosnia	or	
US	companies	such	as	DynCorp	or	Blackwater	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	
15	For	private	military	and	security	companies	see	Mandel	(2002);	Singer	(2003);	Krahmann	(2005);	Lean-
der	(2005).
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Marauders	by	contrast	are	demobilised	or	scattered	former	combatants	who	engage	in	looting,	
pillaging	and	terrorising	defenceless	civilians	during	or	after	the	end	of	a	violent	conflict.	They	
display	a	relatively	low	level	of	organisational	cohesion	and	move	from	one	place	to	another.	
A	particular	version	is	the	so-called	sobel,	a	neologism	combining	the	words	soldier	and	rebel	
(soldiers	 by	day,	 rebels	 by	night).	As	described	paradigmatically	 in	 the	 case	of	 Sierra	Leone,	
sobels	 are	members	of	 an	under-funded,	disorganised	army;	 after	work	 they	aim	at	making	
private	profit	out	of	criminal	and	commercial	activities	such	as	looting,	robbery,	the	collection	
of	protection	money,	abductions,	lynching	(see	Richards	1996).	Marauders	are	therefore	benefi-
ciaries	of	a	chaotic	situation	triggered	by	the	central	government’s	loss	of	control	over	(parts	of )	
its	territory.	In	some	cases,	however,	marauders	may	be	deployed	strategically	by	regular	armed	
forces,	paramilitaries	or	political	movements	as	auxiliaries	to	handle	the	“dirty	business”	of	eth-
nic	cleansing,	massacres	of	the	civilian	population	or	the	persecution	of	political	opponents.
2.1 Similarities and Differences
Despite	their	different	profile,	there	is	a	number	of	common	features	which	makes	it	increa-
singly	difficult	to	distinguish	analytically	between	these	types.	In	particular,	three	trends	have	
contributed	 to	 this:	 First,	most	 of	 these	 armed	non-state	 actors	 frequently	 use	–	 albeit	 to	 a	
different	degree	and	by	different	means	–	violence	against	unarmed	civilians.	Sometimes	this	
happens	accidentally	but	in	most	cases	this	is	part	of	a	strategy	in	order	to	exploit,	intimidate	
or	deter	people,	to	provoke	reactions	from	the	government	and	to	undermine	the	authority	and	
legitimacy	of	state	institutions	who	are	apparently	not	able	to	protect	the	population.	In	other	
words,	non-state	armed	actors	generally	do	not	care	a	great	deal	for	the	distinction	made	by	
humanitarian	international	law	between	combatants	and	non-combatants.	If	anything,	such	a	
distinction	may	have	played	a	role	for	classical	rebel	or	guerrilla	movements,	who	avoided	using	
excessive	violence	against	the	civilian	population,	since	the	latter	represented	a	source	of	–	at	
least	temporary	–	support	for	the	insurgents.	They	primarily	attacked	members	of	the	regular	
armed	and	security	forces;	however,	they	tended	to	view	as	‚combatants‘	all	representatives	of	
the	state	apparatus	(e.g.	politicians,	policemen,	judges)	and	thereby	extended	the	notion	of	com-
batant	far	beyond	the	rather	strict	definition	by	international	law.	Most	often,	the	reference	to	
this	distinction	is	purely	rhetorical	and	an	act	of	propaganda.	In	contemporary	conflicts,	espe-
cially	intra-state	ones,	most	parties	do	not	respect	the	difference	between	combatants	and	non-
combatants.	On	the	contrary,	far	from	receiving	special	protection,	the	civilian	population	has	
for	a	number	of	reasons	become	the	primary	target	of	various	armed	non-state	actors	pursuing	
political	and	economic	gains.
Second,	another	trend	emerging	since	the	1990s	has	been	the	process	of	transnationalisation	
which	has	various	dimensions:	Some	groups	simply	cooperate	across	borders	with	other	orga-
nisations.	In	other	cases,	groups	build	up	their	own	transnational	ties	and	networks,	mainly	for	
support	and	financial	and	logistical	purposes,	by	using	for	example	diasporas,	NGOs,	cultural	
organisations,	business	men,	ethnic	and	religious	ties.	A	group	may	turn	into	a	transnational	
actor	which	operates	simultaneously	in	various	states	and	regions.	In	any	case,	transnationali-
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sation	offers	new	opportunities	and	room	for	manoeuvre.	Transnationalisation	not	only	facili-
tates	the	linking-up	of	war	or	post-war	economies	with	cross-border	smuggling	routes	and	glo-
bal	‘shadow’	markets;	it	moreover	fosters	the	transmission	of	political	agendas	and	ideological	
propaganda	that	are	disseminated	through	supporters	and	international	media.	The	degree	of	
transnationalisation	varies	from	one	type	of	group	to	another:	In	particular,	numerous	terrorist	
and	criminal	organisations	make	use	of	transnational	relations;	the	same	is	true	for	many	rebel	
groups	and	warlords	as	well	as	for	mercenaries	and	private	security	companies	who	operate	in	
different	states.	On	the	other	hand,	processes	of	transnationalisation	are	less	relevant	for	clan	
chiefs,	marauders	and	most	militias.	
Closely	linked	to	the	transnationalisation	issue,	a	third	trend	can	be	recognised:	Armed	non-
state	actors	move	more	and	more	from	a	hierarchical	organisation	into	the	direction	of	rather	
loose	network	structures.	One	can	conclude:	This	seems	to	be	more	likely,	the	more	the	groups	
act	across	borders.	Again,	terrorist	and	criminal	networks	are	the	precursors	of	this	trend,	as	
well	 as	 rebels,	warlords,	marauders	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 degree	 other	 groups,	which	 increasingly	
show	elements	of	network	structures	that	include	flat	hierarchies,	a	high	degree	of	flexibility	
and	rather	autonomous	sub-units	 linked	to	each	other.	In	other	words,	actors	become	more	
fragmented	and	the	leadership	and	command	levels	become	less	able	to	achieve	coherence	in	
strategic	and	ideological	terms.	
Yet,	despite	these	similarities,	from	an	analytical	point	of	view,	four	criteria	in	particular	bring	
the	differences	between	these	types	into	perspective	(see	Table	1):	
Change versus status quo orientation:	 Some	 armed	non-state	 actors	 seek	 a	 (radical)	 change	
of	 the	 status	 quo;	 they	 demand	 a	 different	 government,	 a	 different	 political	 system,	 the	
secession	of	a	region,	a	new	world	order,	etc.	By	contrast,	other	groups	–	whether	driven	
by	own	interests	or	instigated	by	those	in	power	whom	they	serve	–	aim	at	securing	and	
consolidating	the	status	quo.	The	former	position	applies	to	terrorists	as	well	as	rebels	and	
guerrilla	fighters,	whereas	the	latter	applies	to	warlords	and	criminals	who	generally	seek	
to	secure	their	achieved	political	and	economic	privileges.	The	same	is	often	true	for	clan	
chiefs	and	big men,	in	particular	when	they	are	integrated	into	the	political	system	by	means	
of	co-optive	rule	or	neo-patrimonial	structures.	The	prototypes	of	a	status	quo	movement,	
however,	are	militias	or	paramilitary	organisations,	which	are	deployed	to	protect	the	rule	
of	a	regime	or	the	dominance	of	particular	groups.	Mercenaries	or	marauders,	by	contrast,	
behave	rather	opportunistically;	sometimes	they	may	serve	the	interest	of	status	quo	forces,	
while	at	other	times	they	may	challenge	them.
Territorial control versus non-territorial tactics:	In	how	far	are	armed	non-state	groups	able	to	
control	a	larger	territory	and,	thereby,	provide	some	key	governance	functions	for	the	popu-
lation	concerned?	Both	guerrilla	movements	and	warlords,	in	principle,	aim	at	the	conquest	
of	and	–	if	possible	–	the	permanent	control	over	territory	in	order	to	establish	state-free	
regions.	Mercenaries	and	private	military	companies	are	usually	employed	for	similar	pur-
poses.	Clan	chiefs	are	also	often	connected	to	a	particular	“homeland”	or	region.	Terrorists,	
1.
2.
Spoilers or Governance Actors?  |  16
on	the	other	hand,	might	have	territorial	ambitions	 (e.g.	the	creation	of	their	own	state);	
however,	 they	 lack	 the	capabilities	 to	conquer	 territory	and	defend	 it	by	military	means.	
The	same	applies	to	marauders	if	one	neglects	the	temporary	control	of	town	districts	or	
villages.	Criminals	are	typically	interested	in	the	control	of	particular	functions	in	towns	
and	regions	(such	as	transactions,	flows	of	goods,	movement	of	people,	protection)	but	not	
in	a	state-like	control	of	territories.	Militias	may	be	characterised	by	both	variants.	Some	
(especially	 large)	militia	organisations	are	capable	of	 securing	or	re-conquering	 territory	
from	rebels,	whereas	other	units	are	assigned	special	tasks	apart	from	territorial	control,	
such	as	the	persecution	of	dissidents.
Physical versus psychological use of violence:	Each	act	of	violence	entails	a	physical	and	psycho-
logical	aspect;	however,	for	some	groups	one	aspect	may	be	more	important	than	the	other.	
Rebels	 and	guerrilla	movements	pursue	 their	goals	primarily	by	 relying	on	 the	physical	
dimension.	Their	aim	is	to	weaken	their	opponent’s	military	strength,	defeat	it	or	force	it	to	
surrender,	and	subsequently	take	its	place.	Terrorists,	by	contrast,	use	violence	because	of	
its	psychological	effects.	Between	these	two	extremes	other	armed	non-state	actors	are	to	be	
found:	Clan	chiefs	or	mercenaries	primarily	use	physical	violence	in	order	to	defeat	rivals	or	
opponents,	while	for	marauders	and	criminals	the	threat	and	use	of	violence	is	often	merely	
a	means	of	intimidation.	Finally,	militias	and	warlords	are	rather	ambivalent	with	regard	to	
the	type	of	violence	they	use;	depending	on	the	group	itself	and	the	general	circumstances	
they	make	use	of	both	forms	of	violence.
Political/ideological versus profit-driven motivation:	Whereas	guerrilla	movements,	militias,	clan	
chiefs,	big	men	and	terrorist	groups	pursue	–	at	least	rhetorically	–	a	socio-political	agen-
da,	often	based	on	ideologies	which	they	need	economic	resources	for,	the	reverse	usually	
holds	true	for	warlords	and	criminals.	They	are	primarily	interested	in	securing	economic	
and	commercial	privileges	and	personal	profits.	Political	power	and	public	offices	as	well	
as	the	use	of	violence	serve	the	realisation	of	their	selfish	economic	interests.	In	that	sense	
warlords	and	criminals	are	not	“apolitical”	actors;	yet,	their	motivation	for	joining	the	poli-
tical	struggle	for	power	is	different	from	that	of	other	political	actors.	Similarly,	mercenari-
es	and	marauders	primarily	pursue	narrowly	defined	profit	interests.
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Table 1: Types of Armed Non-State Actors
Change vs. 
Status Quo
Territorial vs.
 Non-Territorial
Physical vs. 
Psychological Use 
of Violence
Political/Ideological 
vs. Profit-Driven 
Motivation
Rebels, 
Guerrillas 
Change Territorial Physical Political
Militias Status quo Territorial 
Non-territorial
Physical
Psychological
Political
Clan Chiefs, 
Big Men 
Status quo Territorial Physical Political 
Warlords Status quo Territorial Physical 
Psychological
Profit-driven
Terrorists Change Non-territorial Psychological Political
Criminals, 
Mafia, Gangs 
Status quo Non-territorial Psychological Profit-driven
Mercenaries, 
PMCs/PSCs 
Indifferent Territorial Physical Profit-driven
Marauders, 
‘Sobels’ 
Indifferent Non-territorial Psychological Profit-driven
To	be	sure,	this	characterisation	constructs	ideal-types	and	does	not	result	from	in-depth	em-
pirical	studies.	In	reality,	however,	cases	do	not	always	fit	in	neatly	with	these	categories	since	
groups	sometimes	undergo	transformation	in	the	course	of	a	conflict.	Rebel	leaders	or	big men,	
for	instance,	may	turn	into	warlords;	militias	or	warlords	may	degenerate	into	ordinary	crimi-
nals;	criminals	become	involved	in	terrorist	networks	and	vice	versa;	militias,	rebels	or	warlords	
increasingly	employ	terrorist	methods,	and	so	on.	Often	what	has	started	as	a	so-called	national	
liberation	movement	ends	in	terrorism	against	unarmed	civilians	(see	cases	in	Northern	Ire-
land	or	Palestine).	And	the	other	way	around:	Some	groups	start	with	terrorist	attacks	in	order	
to	mobilise	the	population,	to	recruit	more	and	more	volunteers	and	to	become	a	rebel	orga-
nisation	(see	e.g.	development	of	UÇK	1996-99).	Moreover,	in	many	cases	we	deal	with	hybrid	
forms	that	are	characterised	by	features	of	different	ideal	types.	Examples	include	the	Tamil	
Tigers	in	Sri	Lanka,	the	FARC	in	Colombia,	the	Hizbullah	in	Lebanon	or	Maoist	rebels	in	Ne-
pal.	These	organisations	could	not	only	control	significant	territory	but	also	launched	terrorist	
attacks	in	other	parts	of	the	country.	They	employed	physical	as	well	as	psychological	means	
of	violence	and	pursue	far-reaching	economic	interests,	some	of	them	–	like	FARC	–	are	addi-
tionally	involved	in	large-scale	criminal	activities	(drug	economy	and	kidnapping).	Therefore,	
these	organisations	are	difficult	to	categorise.	
Nonetheless	it	does	make	sense	to	hold	on	to	these	distinctions,	because	they	allow	for	making	
assessments	regarding	the	extent	to	which	particular	groups	or	individuals	correspond	to	these	
ideal	type	categories.	More	importantly,	in	order	to	analyse	the	transition	of	a	particular	group,	
criteria	that	distinguish	one	situation	from	another	are	necessary	and	can	be	provided	by	the	
proposed	typology.	This	method	not	only	has	international	legal	and	sociological	implications	
but	is	also	relevant	for	practical	policy	purposes	since	it	may	be	helpful	for	developing	coun-
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ter-strategies	and	counter-measures	and	to	assess	which	actors	are	more	or	less	likely	to	spoil	
international	state-	and	peace-building	efforts.	
3. Engaging Armed Non-State Groups
Generally	speaking,	international	efforts	in	peace-	and	state-building,	implying	the	strengthe-
ning	or	reconstruction	of	state	structures	and	institutions,	do	challenge	the	position	of	most	
armed	non-state	actors	–	a	notable	exception	are	commercial	security	and	military	companies	
which	largely	depend	on	government	contracts.	On	the	whole,	capable	state	structures	would	
limit	their	room	for	manoeuvre	and	opportunities	to	pursue	their	political	and/or	economic	
agendas.	Some	groups	would	face	disarmament	and,	eventually,	dissolution.	Others	would	pro-
bably	be	forced	to	transform	themselves,	i.e.	to	become	political	forces	or	to	integrate	into	of-
ficial	state	structures,	while	criminals,	mercenaries	or	marauders	would	simply	risk	economic	
profits	and	face	law	enforcement	measures.	Therefore,	these	groups	are	more	likely	to	challenge	
than	to	support	any	steps	that	would	strengthen	or	(re-)establish	the	state’s	monopoly	on	the	
use	of	force.	This	behaviour	can	be	observed	in	almost	every	international	intervention,	ranging	
from	Bosnia	and	Kosovo	to	Somalia,	Haiti,	Afghanistan,	and	DR	Congo.	In	these	cases,	the	in-
ternational	community	is	confronted	with	the	following	dilemma:	On	the	one	hand,	peace-	and	
state-building	activities	have	 to	be	 implemented	against	 the	vested	 interests	of	 these	armed	
actors	in	order	to	achieve	positive	results	in	the	long-run.	On	the	other	hand,	progress	regar-
ding	a	secure	environment	is	often	only	possible	if	at	least	the	most	powerful	of	these	actors	
can	be	involved	in	a	political	process	which	grants	them	some	kind	of	political	influence	(e.g.	
posts	in	an	interim	government)	and/or	economic	and	financial	privileges	which	may	in	turn	
undermine	the	whole	process	of	state-building.	
In	other	words,	armed	non-state	actors	are	not	only	part	of	the	problem	but	must,	as	stated	in	
the	beginning,	sometimes	also	be	part	of	the	solution	(for	case	studies,	see	Ricigliano	2005).	In	
particular	with	regard	to	already	established	para-state	structures	by	warlords,	rebels, big men	
or	militias,	the	question	is	whether	it	is	possible	to	use	these	structures	as	temporary	solutions	
and	building	blocs	for	reconstructing	statehood,	or	whether	this	would	simply	increase	the	risk	
of	strengthening	and	legitimising	them	so	that	the	establishment	of	the	state’s	monopoly	on	
the	use	of	force	becomes	even	less	likely.	In	other	words,	those	actors	who	in	theory	have	the	
greatest	potential	for	state-building	and	security	governance	are	also	the	ones	who	can	mobilise	
the	greatest	spoiling	power.	Moreover,	the	international	community	runs	the	risk	of	sending	
the	wrong	message	(“violence	pays”)	by	devoting	too	much	attention	or	by	granting	privileges	
to	armed	non-state	actors	who	have	already	benefited	from	war	and	shadow	economies.	This	
may	not	only	trigger	increasing	demands	by	these	actors	but	also	seriously	harm	the	credibility	
and	legitimacy	of	external	actors	vis-à-vis	the	general	public	(“moral	hazard”	problem).	The	task	
becomes	even	more	difficult	the	more	the	three	trends	mentioned	above	prevail:	If	an	actor	has	
been	or	is	involved	in	gross	human	rights	violations,	if	an	actor	becomes	transnationalised	and	
can	exploit	opportunities	across	borders,	and	if	an	actor	 is	characterised	by	a	 loose	network	
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 21 • October 2009  |  19
structure	where	central	decision-making	can	no	longer	be	assured	–	all	these	factors	may	make	
deals	by	international	mediators	or	facilitators	with	these	actors	more	and	more	difficult.
3.1 Options for Dealing with Armed Non-State Actors
Clearly,	there	are	no	satisfying	answers	to	these	questions.	Considering	past	experience,	con-
text-specific,	flexible	arrangements	in	dealing	with	armed	non-state	actors	will	always	be	neces-
sary.	However,	more	broadly	speaking,	in	principle	the	international	community	has	a	number	
of	 options	 for	“spoiler	management”	 at	 its	 disposal.	One	prominent	 attempt	 to	 systematise	
strategies	 for	dealing	with	non-state	 armed	groups	 is	Stedman’s	 (1997),	which	distinguished	
three	so-called	spoiler	management	strategies:	positive	propositions	or	inducements	in	order	
to	counter	demands	made	by	non-state	armed	groups;	 socialisation	 in	order	 to	bring	about	
situational	or	even	normative	changes	of	behaviour;	and	arbitrary	measures	in	order	to	weaken	
armed	groups	or	 force	 them	to	accept	certain	terms.	A	study	conducted	by	the	German	De-
velopment	Institute	(Deutsches	Institut	für	Entwicklungspolitik,	DIE)	identified	avoidance	of	
engagement,	disregard/observation/involuntary	engagement,	apolitical	action/equidistance,	ex-
clusion,	and	cooperation	as	possible	courses	of	action	for	development	agencies	when	dealing	
with	non-state	armed	groups	(see	Grävingholt/Hofmann/Klingebiel	2007).	Under	closer	scru-
tiny	however,	these	approaches	lack	theoretical	substantiation	and	do	not	cover	the	complete	
range	of	options	available.
The	benefit	of	using	International	Relations	theory	in	this	respect	is	that	different	camps	and	
strategic	orientations	in	dealing	with	armed	groups	can	be	better	structured	and	understood.	
As	each	of	these	approaches	is	linked	to	particular	paradigms	and	world	views,	which	explicitly	
or	implicitly	carry	with	them	assumptions	about	the	character	of	the	underlying	conflict	as	well	
as	about	the	nature	and	the	typical	behaviour	of	armed	groups	when	they	are	confronted	with	
particular	situations,	means	and	actions.	Firstly,	realist approaches,	which	ultimately	focus	on	the	
elimination	of,	the	suppression	of,	or	the	control	over	non-state	armed	groups	in	order	to	force	
them	to	adapt	to	a	new	situation;	secondly,	institutionalist approaches,	which	aim	at	changes	of	
interests	and	policies	of	these	groups;	and	thirdly,	constructivist approaches,	which	concentrate	
on	a	change	in	norms	(such	as	non-violence)	and	in	self-conception	(identity)	of	the	respective	
actor.	Thus,	 the	directions	do	not	only	differ	 regarding	 strategies	 and	 instruments,	but	 also	
show	different	underlying	assumptions	with	respect	 to	 learning	processes	of	armed	groups,	
ranging	from	pure	adaptation	to	changes	of	preferences	 to	changes	of	 identity.	Accordingly,	
the	 approaches	base	 themselves	on	different	mechanisms	and	 result	 in	different	degrees	of	
behavioural	change:	The	realist	approach	mainly	rests	on	the	application	of	force	and	the	use	
of	leverage,	which	may	precipitate	a	behavioural	change	only	as	long	as	force	is	applied.	Under	
such	pressure	from	the	outside,	non-state	armed	groups	may	change	their	policies	but	usually	
inherent	preferences	will	 remain	unchanged	–	on	 the	contrary,	 their	positions	may	become	
even	more	hard-line	than	before.	The	institutional	approach	focuses	on	bargaining	as	its	key	
mechanism,	which	may	achieve	a	sustainable	result	but	relies	heavily	on	the	respective	actor	
remaining	a	part	of	the	bargaining	system.	Only	the	continuous	application	of	an	institutional	
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setting	offers	enough	incentives	and	guidance	in	order	to	first	change	policies	and	later	pos-
sibly	preferences.	Constructivists	rest	their	efforts	on	persuasion:	a	result	may	be	difficult	to	
achieve	but	if	a	behavioural	change	occurs	it	is	–	in	theory	–	sustainable	as	the	motivation	to	
behave	conformingly	and	may	over	time	be	internalised	by	the	actor	(see	Table	2).	The	literature	
accounts	for	an	array	of	approaches	which	may	roughly	be	assigned	to	these	differing	tenden-
cies	(see	Schneckener	2003,	2006b;	Newman/Richmond	2006).
Table 2: Approaches for Dealing with Armed Non-State Groups
Approach Key Mechanism Behavioural Change
Based on
Result
Realist Force/Leverage Adaptation
Non-Sustainable
(based on the constant 
application of force)
Institutionalist Bargaining
Adaptation;
Policy/Preference Change
Sustainable
(within institutional 
framework)
Constructivist Persuasion
Adaptation;
Policy/Preference Change;
Identity Change
Sustainable
3.2 Realist approaches
Coercion:	International	actors	may	use	coercive	measures,	including	the	use	of	force	and	co-
ercive	diplomacy	(see	Art/Cronin	2003;	George	1991,	1996).	Typical	instruments	are	military	
or	police	operations	aimed	at	fighting	or	arresting	members	of	armed	groups,	the	deplo-
yment	of	international	troops	in	order	to	stabilise	a	post-war	situation	or	the	implemen-
tation	of	 international	sanctions	 (e.g.	arms	embargoes,	no-fly	zones,	economic	sanctions,	
freezing	of	foreign	assets,	travel	sanctions,	war	criminal	tribunals),	which	could	harm	the	
interests	of	at	least	some	non-state	armed	groups,	in	particular	paramilitaries,	rebel	leaders,	
warlords	and	clan	chiefs.	This	approach	is	often	accompanied	by	law	enforcement	measures	
at	national	 and/or	 international	 level.	An	 example	 for	 the	 latter	 are	 the	 activities	 by	 the	
International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	or	other	international	courts	against	war	criminals	or	
persons	committing	serious	crimes	(e.g.	use	of	child	soldiers).16
Control and containment:	This	strategy	aims	at	systematically	controlling	and	containing	the	
activities	of	armed	non-state	groups	and,	 thereby,	 reducing	 their	 freedom	to	manoeuvre	
and	communicate.	The	aim	 is	 to	maintain	a	 certain	 status	quo	and	 to	put	 these	groups	
under	strict	surveillance	(by	using	police	and	intelligence	measures).	This	can	be	done	in	
16	For	instance,	the	ICC	has	issued	warrants	of	arrest	against	five	leading	members	of	the	rebel-style	Lord 
Resistance Army	 (LRA)	 in	Uganda,	 including	its	commander-in-chief	Joseph	Kony,	as	well	as	various	
warrants	of	arrest	against	leaders	of	armed	groups	in	the	DR	Congo	in	2005.	
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particular	with	groups	who	are	concentrated	in	a	certain	territory	which	can	be	cut	off	(e.g.	
by	the	use	of	fences	or	check	points)	from	the	rest	of	the	country	(see	Palestine/Israel).	
Marginalisation and isolation:	This	 approach	 is	 concerned	with	 reducing	 the	political	 and	
ideological	 influence	of	armed	groups.	The	 idea	 is	 to	marginalise	 their	world	views	and	
demands	in	public	discourse	and	to	isolate	them	–	politically	as	well	as	physically	–	from	
actual	or	potential	followers	and	their	constituencies.	For	that	scenario,	a	broad	consensus	
is	needed	among	political	elites	and	societal	groups	not	to	deal	with	these	actors	and	not	
to	react	to	their	violent	provocations,	but	to	continue	an	agreed	political	process.	This	ap-
proach	is	an	option	particularly	for	rather	weak	or	already	weakened	actors	such	as	smaller	
rebel	groups,	terrorists	or	marauders.
Enforcing splits and internal rivalry:	Another	option	aims	at	fragmenting	and	splitting	armed	
groups	between	more	moderate	 forces	and	hardliners.	This	can	be	achieved	by	different	
means,	be	it	the	threat	of	using	force	indiscriminately,	by	offering	secret	deals	to	some	key	
figures	or	by	involving	them	in	a	political	process,	which	would	encourage	them	to	leave	
their	group	or	to	transform	it	into	a	political	movement.	The	strategy,	however,	can	result	
in	the	establishment	of	radical	fringe	and	splinter	groups,	which	may	be	even	more	extreme	
than	the	former	unified	group.	Such	fragmentation	processes	can	often	be	observed	with	
rebel	or	terrorist	groups.
Bribery and blackmail:	Members	of	armed	groups	being	corrupted	in	a	certain	way	–	they	may	
be	forced	or	induced	to	cooperate	or	silenced	through	the	offering	of	material	incentives,	
i.e.	economic	resources	or	well-paid	posts.	In	some	cases,	this	may	also	involve	attempts	to	
blackmail	or	to	intimidate	leaders	(e.g.	threatening	family	members)	in	order	to	make	them	
more	 likely	 to	 accept	money	or	other	offers.	This	 strategy	 is	politically	 and	normatively	
questionable;	however,	in	some	cases	it	is	indispensable	for	getting	a	peace	process	started	
in	the	first	place	(see	Afghanistan).	In	particular,	profit-driven	actors,	such	as	warlords	or	
criminals	have	often	been	receptive	to	such	a	strategy.	
Most	of	these	approaches	involve	a	mixture	of	sticks	and	carrots,	occasionally	including	deals	
with	the	group,	with	the	leadership,	or	with	some	key	members	in	order	to	alter	their	behavi-
our	to	conform	at	least	in	the	short-term.	Therefore,	in	most	instances,	these	strategies	are	not	
used	exclusively	but	in	combination.	For	example,	the	concept	of	counterinsurgency	combines	
some	of	these	approaches	in	order	not	only	to	fight	against	rebels	or	other	groups	but	also	to	
cut	off	the	links	between	an	armed	group	and	its	(potential)	constituency	or	supporters	among	
the	population	(see	Galula	2006;	Hoffman	2004;	Jeapes	2005;	O’Neill	2005;	The	U.S.	Army	&	Ma-
rine	Corps	2007).	Still,	the	focus	is	mainly	on	coercive	measures	backed	by	(material)	incentives	
which	somehow	reflect	the	underlying	assumption	that	most	leaders	of	armed	groups	at	the	
end	of	the	day	are	not	driven	by	ideals	but	by	selfish	interests.	For	realists,	the	bottom	line	reads	
as	follows:	If	one	is	able	to	put	enough	pressure	on	them	and/or	offer	them	some	profits,	these	
people	will	ultimately	go	along.	
3.
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3.2 Institutionalist approaches
Mediation and negotiation:	Using	this	approach,	external	actors	aim	primarily	at	fostering	a	
negotiation	process	among	different	parties,	including	armed	non-state	actors,	in	order	to	
find	a	political	settlement	(see	Bercovitch	2002;	Touval/Zartman	1985;	Zartman/Rasmussen	
1997;	 Zegveld	 2002).	As	 facilitators	 or	mediators	 they	would	 try	 to	 urge	 armed	 actors	 to	
refrain	from	the	use	of	force	and	to	abandon	maximalist	political	demands.	For	that	pur-
pose,	 informal	 contacts,	multi-track	 diplomacy	 and	 extensive	 pre-negotiations	 are	 often	
necessary,	 in	particular	when	direct	 contacts	between	 the	 conflicting	parties	 (e.g.	 a	 local	
government	and	a	rebel	group)	are	unlikely.	Usually,	 in	such	a	process	pros	and	cons	of	
possible	solutions	have	to	be	weighed,	incentives	and	disincentives	(e.g.	possible	sanctions)	
have	to	be	taken	into	account	and	a	compromise	acceptable	for	all	sides	has	to	be	found.	
Oftentimes	arguing	and	bargaining	methods	 (including	cost-benefit	analysis)	need	to	be	
combined	in	order	to	achieve	such	an	outcome.	These	approaches	obviously	imply	a	long-
term	engagement,	since	during	the	implementation	of	agreements	mediation	may	still	be	
necessary.	This	scenario	applies	mainly	to	groups	with	a	political	agenda	which	are	stron-
gly	tied	to	a	defined	constituency	(e.g.	tribe,	clan,	ethnic	group,	political	party).	The	most	
likely	cases,	therefore,	are	clan	chiefs,	big	men	or	rebel	leaders;	in	some	instances	terrorists	
or	warlords	may	also	be	part	of	such	a	process,	in	particular	when	they	seek	to	transform	
themselves	into	“politicians”.
Cooptation and integration:	Here	the	basic	idea	is	that	non-state	armed	groups,	and	in	particu-
lar	the	respective	leadership,	can	be	co-opted	and	slowly	integrated	into	a	political	setting,	
for	example	by	distributing	resources	and	sharing	political	responsibility.	Therefore,	this	
approach	implies	a	certain	degree	of	informal	or	formalised	power-sharing,	be	it	at	natio-
nal	or	local	level,	which	would	involve	leaders	of	armed	groups	in	day-to-day	politics	(see	
Hartzell/Hoddie	2007;	ICRC	2003;	O’Flynn/Russel	2005;	Jarstad	2008).	In	other	words,	the	
attempt	would	be	to	give	them	a	role	to	play,	which	may	then	change	their	attitudes	and	
preferences.	This	strategy	is	sometimes	based	on	a	formal	agreement,	brokered	by	outsi-
ders,	but	it	is	often	pursued	by	efforts	of	building	alliances	and	coalitions	among	different	
local	groups.	A	good	illustration	for	that	approach	was	the	attempt	to	gradually	integrate	
Afghan	warlords	into	the	newly	established	political	system,	not	least	by	offering	posts	such	
as	governors	or	ministers	but	also	by	granting	them	a	certain	political	status	quo.	Similar	
processes	can	be	observed	in	various	African	societies	with	regard	to	clan	chiefs,	big	men,	
or	certain	militia	groups.	
At	the	heart	of	institutionalist	approaches	is	the	establishment	of	procedures,	rules	and	insti-
tutional	settings	which	allow	for	some	kind	of	peaceful	coexistence	and,	at	the	same	time,	open	
a	room	for	bargaining,	negotiation	or	mediation	processes	in	order	to	reach	a	political	agree-
ment.	Here,	in	contrast	to	the	realist	version,	the	starting	point	is	that	many	armed	non-state	
actors	are	indeed	driven	by	certain	grievances	and	political	demands,	which	can	be	addressed	
through	negotiations	and/or	other	means.	Even	if	the	leadership	is	corrupt	and	greedy,	in	many	
instances,	they	must	show	some	kind	of	political	programme	or	agenda	in	order	to	find	follo-
1.
2.
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wers	and	supporters	in	local	communities.	In	other	words,	even	the	most	selfish	leaders	are	un-
der	pressure	to	deliver	–	and	therefore	may	be	receptive	for	incentives	and	guarantees,	assured	
by	institutional	arrangements.	
3.3 Constructivist approaches
Socialisation:	By	involving	armed	non-state	actors	into	processes	and	institutions,	this	ap-
proach	claims	that	over	time	chances	will	increase	that	spoilers	would	be	successively	soci-
alised	into	accepting	certain	norms	and	rules	of	the	game	(see	in	particular	Hofmann	2006).	
Armed	groups	would	undergo	processes	of	collective	learning,	which	would	alter	strategies	
and,	eventually,	their	self-conception	as	an	actor.	This	medium-	to	long-term	strategy	may	
again	work	best	for	those	armed	actors	with	clear	political	ambitions	who	have	to	address	
long-term	expectations	of	their	constituencies	and	develop	an	interest	in	improving	their	
local	as	well	as	international	image.	Such	are	primarily	rebel	movements	but	also	clan	chiefs	
and	big	men.	
Naming and shaming: The	attempt	here	is	to	organise	social	pressure	and	to	campaign	pu-
blicly,	at	national	and/or	international	level,	against	certain	practices	of	armed	non-state	ac-
tors	in	order	to	harm	their	legitimacy	within	and	outside	of	their	(actual	or	potential)	cons-
tituencies.	The	aim	is	usually	to	persuade	them	to	accept	and	respect	certain	agreements	
and	norms,	in	particular	norms	of	humanitarian	international	law	and	to	foster	them	to	re-
frain	from	certain	violent	methods	(such	as	terrorist	acts)	and	from	using	particular	means	
(e.g.	land	mines	or	child	soldiers).	Often	these	campaigns	are	conducted	by	international	
NGOs.	Again,	this	approach	may	be	useful	in	cases	involving	groups	that	need	moral	and	
material	support	from	abroad.	
Amnesty	(i.e.	exemption	from	punishment	or	mitigation	of	punishment):	Granting	amnesty	
for	certain	crimes	and	actions	committed	by	members	of	armed	groups	may	be	an	incentive	
to	change	behaviour	and	to	respect	certain	norms	in	the	future.	This	approach	is	highly	
problematic	from	a	normative	point	of	view	since	it	will	not	give	justice	to	the	victims	of	
violence	and	serious	human	rights	violations.	However,	it	could	work	under	certain	circum-
stances	as	a	final	stimulus	to	end	violence	or	not	to	return	to	the	use	of	violence.	Generally,	
amnesty	would	be	part	of	a	greater	political	package	and	may	not	be	applied	to	every	crime	
or	every	group	member.	In	reality,	this	option	often	runs	the	problem	that	leading	figures	of	
armed	groups	receive	amnesty,	whereas	lower	ranks	are	punished,	which	causes	a	so-called	
impunity	gap.	Nevertheless,	amnesty	might	be	especially	attractive	for	groups	whose	mem-
bers	are	already	willing	to	opt	for	a	different	life	and	whose	leaders	are	willing	to	opt	for	a	
different	political	career,	thus	already	displaying	signs	of	genuine	behavioural	change.
In	general,	constructivist	approaches	put	an	emphasis	on	the	role	of	arguing	and	persuading	
as	well	as	on	processes	of	norm	transfer.	All	three	approaches	have	in	common	that	they	try	to	
persuade	armed	groups	to	accept,	respect	and,	eventually,	internalise	norms.	The	ultimate	goal	
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is	to	foster	long-term	transformation	processes	that	not	only	involve	different	behaviour	for	
some	tactical	reasons	but	also	a	genuine	and	sustainable	change	of	the	actor’s	policies	and	self-
conception.	The	assumption	here	is	that	armed	non-state	actors	can	be	affected	by	norms	and	
arguments	since	many	of	them	are	concerned	with	their	public	image,	their	moral	authority	
(vis-à-vis	their	enemies),	and	their	sources	of	legitimacy.	And	indeed,	a	number	of	leaders	refer	
in	their	public	statements	to	general	norms	and,	thereby,	 try	to	argue	their	case	also	from	a	
normative	perspective.	So,	as	constructivists	would	ask,	why	not	take	them	seriously	and	engage	
them	in	debates	about	norms	and	standards?	
4. Conclusion: Problems and Limits
The	 strategies	 and	methods	discussed	 above	have	 their	downsides	 and	 limitations.	 In	most	
instances,	a	combination	of	approaches	will	be	necessary	since	typically	both	incentives	and	
disincentives	are	needed	to	achieve	behavioural	changes,	which	would	eventually	 lead	to	the	
reduction	or	denunciation	of	violent	means.	This	renders	a	linking	of	particular	strategies	with	
particular	ideal-types	of	non-state	armed	groups	impossible.	Moreover,	there	is	a	number	of	
other	factors	which	may	determine	the	outcome	of	the	strategies.	At	least	four	different	cate-
gories	of	factors	need	to	be	addressed	in	more	detail:	(i)	the	general	environment	in	which	the	
engagement	with	armed	groups	does	take	place	(e.g.	before,	during	or	after	a	violent	conflict),	(ii)	
the	characteristics	of	the	actor	that	applies	certain	strategies	(e.g.	an	international	organisation,	
a	state	or	a	NGO?),	(iii)	kind	and	quality	of	interaction	between	the	third	party	and	an	armed	
group	(e.g.	pre-existing	links,	long-term	versus	short-term	relationship)	and	(iv)	the	characteris-
tics	of	the	specific	armed	groups,	including	the	conditions	which	enable	the	group	to	exist	and	
to	perform	(i.e.	access	to	resources,	recruitment	patterns,	outside	support,	capable	leadership,	
organisational	skills,	transnational	ties).	
A	close	investigation	of	all	these	factors	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	What	it	does	suggest	
is	that	scientific	engagement	with	armed	non-state	actors	faces	a	number	of	problems	which	
have	largely	been	neglected	by	the	predominant	strategies.	In	what	follows,	three	of	these	will	
be	sketched:
First	of	all,	 the	most	 important	aspect	seems	to	be	that	the	various	approaches	by	and	large	
concentrate	on	the	same	pattern	of	aspects	of	non-state	violence.	Despite	variation	in	perpec-
tive	and	analysis	all	approaches	have	a	tendency	to	focus	mainly	on	armed	groups	which	are	
politically	or	ideologically	motivated,	who	have	leaders	with	personal	political	aspirations,	show	
an	interest	in	international	attention	and	support	and	have	links	with	a	particular	constituency,	
often	in	combination	with	the	control	over	territory.	In	other	words,	in	particular	institutiona-
list	and	constructivist	approaches	tend	to	concentrate	on	armed	groups	who	perform	–	inten-
ded	or	unintended	–	governance	functions	vis-à-vis	certain	segments	of	the	population	or	who	
have	at	least	governance	potential.	The	assumption	is	that	in	such	cases	in	order	to	keep	or	to	
gain	popular	support	non-state	actors	are	more	likely	to	respond	constructively	to	incentives	
by	third	parties.	This	profile	fits	best	with	classical	rebel	organisations,	clan	chiefs	and	militias,	
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less	so	with	terrorists	or	warlords;	it	does	not	fit	at	all	with	criminals,	mercenaries	or	marau-
ders.	Only	within	the	realist	paradigm	also	purely	profit-driven	actors	–	the	extreme	type	being	
„greedy	spoilers“	 (Stedman	1997)	–	may	be	addressed,	 in	particular	by	bribery	and	blackmail	
strategies.	The	approaches	are	thus	not	equipped	to	cover	the	full	range	of	armed	non-state	
groups	as	presented	in	this	paper.	One	could	even	argue	that	conceptually	and	empirically	the	
range	of	types	addressed	decreases	from	the	realist	to	the	institutionalist	to	the	constructivist	
paradigm.	Moreover,	most	of	these	approaches	rest	implicitly	on	the	assumption	that	armed	
groups	are	“coherent	actors”	with	identifiable	leaders	and	spokespersons	who	can	be	affected	
by	force,	incentives	or	arguments	and	who	would	be	able	to	respond	in	a	“coherent”	manner	
(i.e.	with	“one	voice”).	They	are	largely	based	on	a	top	down-perspective,	neglecting	the	fact	that	
leadership,	individual	field	commanders,	foot	soldiers,	supporters	and	sympathisers	have	to	be	
treated	differently	since	they	may	pursue	different	interests	and	motivations.	Especially	mid-
levels	and	grassroots-levels	within	armed	groups	seem	to	have	been	systematically	neglected	
so	far.	If	these	shortcomings	are	observed	correctly	and	if	the	above-mentioned	trends	about	
transnationalisation	and	network	structures	are	equally	correct,	then	these	approaches	run	into	
the	problem	that	more	and	more	groups	or	movements	can	hardly	be	engaged	through	these	
methods,	be	they	based	on	military	and	legal	counter-measures,	on	negotiation	techniques	or	
on	persuasion	campaigns.	This	is	already	the	case	with	regard	to	some	warlord	configurations,	
criminal	or	terrorist	networks	or	smaller	groups	of	gunmen	who	may	be	hired	for	all	kinds	of	
purposes.	
Secondly,	the	situation	in	most	conflict	or	post-conflict	settings	is	rather	complex	since	several	
armed	groups	with	different	characteristics	and	different	agendas	are	involved.	Usually	a	variety	
of	groups	exists:	Some	collaborate,	others	fight	each	other.	Some	are	being	instrumentalised,	
some	are	openly	or	secretly	supported.	Some,	like	militias,	are	deliberately	set	up	by	the	natio-
nal	government,	while	others	–	in	particular	rebels	or	terrorists	–	are	combated.	And	to	make	
this	even	more	complicated:	Many	groups	change	their	structure	and,	eventually,	their	goals	in	
the	course	of	a	conflict.	At	the	same	time,	a	number	of	external	actors	such	as	states,	internatio-
nal	organisations	or	NGOs	display	different	means	and	philosophies	when	dealing	with	armed	
non-state	actors.	Thus,	in	many	cases	a	plurality	of	external	“interveners”	is	involved,	be	it	in-
tended	or	unintended,	applying	diverging	approaches	for	dealing	with	armed	groups.	As	stated	
above,	in	theory,	the	approaches	may	complement	each	other.	In	practice,	however,	on	the	ope-
rational	level	the	attempts	by	various	“interveners”	exist	in	parallel:	They	follow	different	goals,	
prioritise	different	means	and	compete	against	each	other.	This	problem	is	further	complicated	
by	the	fact	that	external	actors	do	not	exchange	information	about	their	own	strategies	vis-à-
vis	armed	groups,	which	may	lead	to	a	number	of	unintended	effects	in	the	field.	For	example,	
armed	groups	are	often	in	a	position	to	play	actors	off	against	each	other	and	use	their	different	
strategies	and	lack	of	communication	to	their	own	advantage.	Moreover,	local	actors	are	aware	
of	the	fact	that	usually	time	is	on	their	side	since	external	actors	will	not	stay	forever	but	need	
to	leave	the	country	because	of	limited	resources	and	public	pressure	at	home.
Thirdly	external	actors	often	lack	knowledge	about	the	armed	non-state	groups	they	are	de-
aling	with	and	about	the	range	of	options	they	may	have	at	 their	disposal	 in	a	specific	case.	
Spoilers or Governance Actors?  |  26
Governments	in	particular	are	often	unwilling	or	unable	to	reflect	the	full	spectrum	of	possible	
approaches	but	tend	to	deliberately	exclude	some	options	(“we	do	not	talk	to	terrorists”).	They	
tend	to	choose	a	certain	approach	that	they	are	most	familiar	with	or	are	most	capable	of	apply-
ing,	but	they	are	not	flexible	enough	to	adapt	their	position	to,	for	example,	a	transformation	of	
an	armed	group	in	the	course	of	the	conflict.	This	has	often	resulted	in	the	expansion	of	coun-
ter-insurgency	or	counter-terrorism	efforts	beyond	their	original	goals	due	to	a	previous	failure	
to	reach	the	set	goals	(“mission	creep”	problem,	see	in	particular	Afghanistan	and	Iraq).	At	the	
same	time,	abandoning	the	mission	in	favour	of	peace	negotiations	is	oftentimes	seen	as	giving	
in	and	awarding	the	use	of	violence	by	non-state	actors.	Instead,	external	actors	dealing	with	
armed	groups	need	to	be	aware	of	the	existing	range	of	approaches	as	well	as	of	their	pros	and	
cons.	This	implies	that	the	international	community	has	to	be	prepared	to	make	ambivalent	
decisions,	risk	backlashes	and	failures	and	put	up	with	normative	dilemmas	(as	for	example	in	
the	case	of	amnesty).	But	external	actors	also	need	to	reflect	the	changing	nature	of	these	groups	
during	and	in	the	aftermath	of	a	conflict	in	order	to	apply	the	appropriate	mix	of	approaches.	
This,	however,	requires	a	much	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	characteristics,	dynamics	
and	opportunity	structures	under	which	these	different	armed	groups	act.
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